The one who dies is deprived of goods that this person would have enjoyed if he or she had continued living, according to the popular "deprivation account of harm." The person who dies "prematurely" is generally thought to suffer the most harm from death. However, the concept of a premature death is unclear, as will be shown. I will evaluate various definitions of a premature death and will argue that the existing definitions are too ambiguous and unreliable to serve as the basis for estimating the degree of harm from death.
If the members of a jury hear a victim of a crime declare that she was harmed, the jurors want to know, not just whether harm occurred, but how much the victim was harmed. Did the harm result in the victim being deprived of only a day's worth of lost wages or was the harm so severe that the victim was deprived of the ability ever to work again? Similarly, when it is claimed that a person was harmed by death, it is important to know, not just whether harm occurred, but the severity of the harm.
Deprivation theorists could be correct that those who die may suffer harm, but incorrect regarding how much harm is occurring. This harm, if it is occurring, might be great or negligible. To convince us that the harm from death is significant enough that it warrants our attention, deprivation theorists must have a reliable and objective method for determining the degree of harm. Does such a method exist? What are the methods used to measure the amount of harm? Are these methods reliable indicators of the degree of harm? The principal aim of this paper is to evaluate the methods utilized to judge the amount of harm from death. I will argue that the existing methods are ambiguous and unreliable and need more work if they are to do the job of measuring the degree of harm.
I. The Relations Between Deprivation, Prematurity, and Harm
Joel Feinberg (1993, p. 187) premature death thus depends on how premature it is, given the interests that defined his own particular good." Feinberg's statement shows that the degree of harm is thought to be positively correlated with the degree of prematurity. In other words, as the level of prematurity or deprivation increases, there is a corresponding increase in the level of harm that is suffered by the one who dies. A person who dies at age 80 is generally thought to suffer little or no harm from death, whereas a person who dies at age 18 is thought to have suffered great harm.
Deprivation theorists believe that death may be harmful to those who die because it deprives them of goods that they would have enjoyed if they had not died when they did. For example, suppose that a person has a strong desire to write a best-selling novel and then is killed at the age of 30 before he had the opportunity to complete the novel. His death will prevent him from ever enjoying the satisfaction of achieving his goal. Even if he had lived to the age of 120, he might never have achieved the goal of writing a best-selling novel. Therefore, deprivation theorists, in estimating how much harm occurs, typically only count goods that one would or might have enjoyed if one had continued living. 4 If a person who has done everything that he wanted to do in life dies at age 45, one could argue that the deprivation of years of life did not result in the deprivation of any goods. Because the deprivation of time does not always result in harm, deprivation theorists are more concerned with determining how many goods were lost to death than simply measuring how much time was lost to death. However, measuring lost What is a good, how do we know that the person who died likely would have enjoyed that good, and how do we place a numeric value on goods to determine the amount and value of goods lost to death? These questions illustrate some of the difficulties one faces in attempting to measure the amount and value of goods lost to death.
People have attempted to measure the amount of harm from death indirectly and directly. The indirect measures focus on measuring the amount of time lost to death, whereas the direct measures focus on measuring the amount and value of goods lost to death. Because deprivation theorists are primarily concerned with lost goods, they tend to use the direct measures of harm, which are more abstract and difficult to quantify than the indirect measures. In contrast, laymen and epidemiologists tend to use the indirect measures of harm.
II. Indirect Measures of Harm
To have the opportunity to enjoy the goods associated with living, one must live for a certain amount of time. If a person lived for only a minute, there would be no enjoyment of goods. There is a correlation between the amount of goods that can be enjoyed in one's life and the length of one's life, but how strong is this correlation? If there were a perfect correlation between the length of one's life and the amount of goods that can be enjoyed in one's life, such that each additional year of life would yield an additional 100 units of goods, then one could indirectly measure goods lost to The indirect measures of harm that will be considered below are based on the assumption that there is a fairly strong correlation between the length of one's life and the amount and value of goods that can be enjoyed in one's life. Is this a correct assumption? If well-being in one's life is not additive, 5 or if one may value goods enjoyed later in life more than goods enjoyed earlier in one's life, then the amount of time lost to death may not be an accurate indication of the value of the goods lost to death. This would pose a problem for the indirect measures of harm.
To judge whether, and to what extent, someone died prematurely, laymen often subtract the age at which the person died from the average life expectancy. For example, if a person died at age 30 and the average life expectancy was 75, then the difference between these two figures -45 years of life -is thought to be the amount of time lost to death.
Knowing the average life expectancy is useful information for economists. However, using the average life expectancy as a method for determining whether an individual died prematurely is arbitrary and problematic. A common misconception of the average life expectancy is that it is a measure of how long an individual can expect to live. 6 The average "life expectancy at birth" measure, which is the most frequently However, there will be a point at which nothing further could be done to prolong this person's life. When the person reaches that limit, he will be at his potential life expectancy.
The results obtained using the person-specific, potential life expectancy measure may 
III. Direct Measures of Harm
Gisela Striker (1988) has defined premature death, not in terms of how much time was lost to death, but in terms of whether one's life was "complete" before one died.
If one died before one's life was complete, then one died prematurely, she argues.
Striker uses the following analogy to suggest that people are concerned, not with how
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The eighteen year old who wants to continue living is like someone who has watched the first act of an opera and is justifiably annoyed if the performance breaks off at this point. He is angry, not because he had thought he was going to spend three hours instead of only one, but because he wanted to see the entire opera, not just a part of it. (Striker 1988, p. 325) Stephen Rosenbaum, who has defended 12 Epicurus' argument that death is nothing to us, calls into question Striker's notion of a premature death. He convincingly argues that the idea of completeness is obscure. (Rosenbaum 1990, pp. 32-35) Our lives, in contrast to operas, are not well structured with standard elements and so the task of specifying what constitutes a complete life is dubious, he argues. If our lives did have standard elements, then it would be possible to convert Striker's definition of a premature death into a measure for calculating the degree of harm from death. For example, if there were 100 standard elements to a life, and a person had completed only 60 of these elements before she died, we could then say that the degree of incompleteness of her life was 40 percent. But, as Rosenbaum argues, the task of identifying standard elements appears to be dubious.
Physicians define a "premature birth" as a birth that occurs before 37 weeks of gestation. 13 Thus, birth prematurity is defined in terms of time, perhaps because it is the simplest method for tracking the progress of a pregnancy. However, a premature birth could also be defined in terms of completeness because a fetus must pass of their deaths will be premature, even if they do not die until they are 100 years old.
This biologically based definition of premature death implies that there is nothing more to life than experiencing childhood and perpetuating the species and that one's life is "complete" once one ceases reproducing. In response, one might argue that the task of parenting does not end at reproduction; a parent or adult is also necessary for child rearing. However, questions then arise about how long a parent is needed to nurture a child and whether it takes two parents or just one to do this task. In effect, the definition of prematurity becomes value-laden.
If a person dies, and he had goals in the years leading up to his death, but achieving these goals left him unfulfilled or miserable, then it seems implausible that he was and goes on to live a long and happy life." (Feldman 1991, 226) Of course, if we imagine this, we will then conclude that the officer's death from Ivan's bullet was very harmful.
As noted earlier, epidemiologists are seeking to improve the "years of potential life lost" measure because it fails to take into account competing risks. If we presume that the child with Tay-Sachs disease would have lived a long life if he had not died in the airplane crash, we will misjudge how much this child was harmed by his death at age three. In the future, treatments may be available to prolong the lives of children born with Tay-Sachs disease. If so, then children born at that time may have a potential life expectancy that is much longer than five years.
IV. A Thought Experiment About Premature Death
What conditions would need to be present for a world to have no premature deaths? If There could be a discrepancy between whether they consider their upcoming deaths premature and whether their deaths would actually be premature. According to the potential life expectancy definition of a premature death, their deaths would not be premature because they live until their potential life expectancy. But if, for example, a person became a grandmother at age 49, and she intensely desired to interact with her grandchildren, she may consider her upcoming death to be premature.
One way that Lifespan 50 differs from the world in which we live is that everyone in this imaginary world knows when they will die, assuming that they remember when they were born. If one knew the date at which one would die, one could avoid beginning projects late in one's life so that these projects would not go uncompleted because of death. However, as shown by the example above where the grandmother wants to interact with her grandchildren, death may prevent us from realizing some of our desires even if we knew the exact date on which we will die.
In this thought experiment, suppose that a life-prolonging substance is created that would allow people to live until age 60, but that there is only enough of this substance for half the population. The other half of the population will live until age 50. Will the people who will not receive the substance die prematurely at the age of 50?
Before addressing this question, it will be useful to reflect on the psychological reactions of the people who will not be receiving the substance. As argued, before the life-prolonging substance became available, some people on Lifespan 50 would likely have been satisfied with living 50 years. If they were not selected to receive the lifeprolonging substance, would they still be satisfied with 50 years of life, or would they, as I suspect, think that they will be dying prematurely at the age of 50?
They will live just as long (50 years) as they would have lived before the substance became available, but they would likely no longer think of themselves as having lived a full life. What would lead them to think that they are dying prematurely? As will be explained, I believe that the answer can be traced to rising expectations and to the desire for fairness. First, the availability of the life-prolonging substance would change their expectation about how long a person can live. They become aware that it is physically possible for a person to live until age 60. Second, previously everyone lived the same amount of time. However, because they will not be receiving the lifeprolonging substance, they will not live as long as the people who will be receiving the substance, which raises issues about fairness. They had been satisfied with 50 years of life, but now that they know that half the population will live until the age of 60 they think that they are entitled to live until that age. had an entitlement to live until the age of 65 and this person's right to live until that age was violated when she died at the age of five.
Are we entitled to live to a certain age? If so, what is the source of that entitlement?
Nature is impersonal and has given us no assurances regarding how long we will live.
Unless we are entitled to live to a certain age, which appears doubtful, there is no basis for including considerations of fairness in judgements about whether, and to what extent, someone was harmed by death.
What does it mean when someone claims that a person died "too soon" or "should have lived longer"? The person might be making a non-moral claim about the death. As Hume (1992, p. 469 ) is well known for pointing out, people have a tendency to go beyond making statements about the way something "is" to making statements about the way something "ought" to be. This leap from "is" to "ought" frequently seems to occur when people learn that someone died at a young age. Instead of simply concluding that the person died at a young age or had a shorter than average lifespan, they claim that the person died "too soon," implying that this person ought to have lived longer than he or she did live.
If someone declares that a person's height is below average, then this individual is making a descriptive statement. However, if this person goes on to declare that this individual is "too short," then this person may be making a normative statement about how tall this individual ought to be. In the same way, when someone declares that a person's death was "too soon," "premature," "untimely," or "before his time," this person may be making a normative statement about how long this person should have lived.
As argued, the judgements that people make about whether, and how much, someone was harmed by death can be biased by the desire for fairness. These judgements can also be influenced by our feelings toward the person who died. For example, Adolph
Hitler's lifespan was shorter than average, but no one would claim that he died prematurely. 
V. The Ambiguity of Measures of Harm
Above we considered what effect the availability of the life-prolonging substance would have on whether the people on Lifespan 50 consider their upcoming deaths to be premature. Due to issues of fairness, those who did not receive the life-prolonging substance would likely think that their deaths will be premature, but is there an objective basis for their conclusions? In other words, when they die at age 50, will they have in fact died prematurely?
Let us first reflect on this question using Striker's definition of a premature death. As argued, it is unclear what are the elements of a "complete" life. For the sake of argument, suppose that there are 100 standard elements to a life and that some of the people who will not be receiving the life-prolonging substance had completed all of the elements. They observed all of the opera, to use Striker's analogy. In not receiving the additional ten years of life, the only thing they missed was the unexpected encore.
In that case, their deaths at age 50 were not premature. analysis, it would be concluded that they had a potential life expectancy of 60 years and were deprived of 10 years of life when they died at age 50.
Whether they had access to the substance should be considered in determining their potential life expectancy. If they did not have access to the life-prolonging substance, then their potential life expectancy was 50 years and so they did not die prematurely. In our daily lives, retrospective judgements about prematurity are probably much more common than are prospective judgements. This is fortunate because prospective judgements are much more difficult to make than retrospective judgements. Based on the potential life expectancy definition of a premature death, it was concluded that there were no premature deaths on Lifespan 50, even after the life-prolonging substance became available. This, however, ignores other factors that may have affected the potential life expectancy of the individuals in this imaginary world. For example, if a massive asteroid was on a course to collide with their planet shortly after the life-prolonging substance had been created, then, assuming that all life would be wiped out, the potential life expectancy of those who received the life-prolonging substance would not have been 60 years.
With retrospective judgements about whether someone died prematurely, there are still many factors that need to be considered in determining how long the person who died could have lived, but because the death has already occurred and we are still alive to discuss it, this rules out scenarios, such as asteroid impact, that could have occurred, but did not occur.
VI. Conclusion
Direct Deprivation theorists might concede that there are problems with the existing measures of harm, but then argue that it is unimportant to know how much harm is suffered. However, as I argue at the outset, it is not enough to know that harm occurs.
It is also important to know the degree of harm. Luper (2006, p. 11) notes: "[P]roponents of the harm theses still have work to do, for their view is not secure unless it is clear that we can be the subject who incurs harms associated with absent goods, and unless there is a clear time when the harms are received." If these challenges can be overcome, the next challenge will be to determine how much harm is occurring. As argued here, the concept of a premature death is ambiguous and can be value laden and therefore requires refinement if it is to serve as the basis for estimating the degree of harm. 
